CUP FIELD TOOLS · Automotive cybersecurity & updates

One vehicle change. Which evidence supports release?

Review one vehicle change or software update. Bring engineering evidence, cybersecurity management and software-update responsibilities into one scoped review before the authorised team decides the next step.

12 chapters · 37 detailed verifications · Initial and detailed review modes · No account required

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WHY USE IT?A component sign-off is only part of the release decision.

Connect the changed item, vehicle configuration, risk treatment and update behaviour to reviewable records. Identify the gaps that need engineering, supplier or homologation input before relying on the release case.

YOUR REVIEW PATH

Scope → Evidence → Action

A focused review with an accountable outcome.

Vehicle changeDefine the reviewed scope
Review ↗
Risk & update evidenceChallenge the supporting records
Review ↗
Release decisionAssign the unresolved actions
Review ↗
Your exportable action plan

Missing records · Owners · Next steps

Illustrative review flow. Select a checkpoint to explore it.

How to use this review

Bring the right people: OEM engineering, supplier, cybersecurity, software-update and homologation roles. Record roles and non-sensitive references.

  1. Define one decision. Record the baseline, applicable basis and accountable owner. Identify uncertain applicability before treating requirements as settled.
  2. Challenge the evidence. Work through twelve questions. Reference existing records, explain what they demonstrate and leave unsupported conclusions open.
  3. Take an action plan to the review. Export a report or CSV, assign owners and dates, and save a review file to update later.

The first pass identifies missing work. It does not complete the underlying assessment, tests or regulatory review. Use “Not applicable” only with a recorded rationale.

Before design or procurement

Agree the scope, responsibilities and evidence to request before accepting a supplier or solution claim.

Before release or deployment

Check the current baseline and unresolved conditions with the authorised decision owner.

After a material change

Reopen the review when the use, configuration, evidence, legal basis or supporting assumptions change.

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Twelve evidence checkpoints

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Automotive cybersecurity & updates · original CUP review prompts
CheckpointEvidence to assembleDecision to resolveReview notes
01 · Applicable vehicle and changeVehicle type, markets, lifecycle stage, change identifier and applicability decision.
Detailed verifications (3)

Suggested review roles: Item owner; homologation owner. Lifecycle: Change intake and applicability. Assess each verification for this chapter’s actual scope and the role responsible for it. Record the applicable requirement/decision reference; any N/A needs a specific reason. These are CUP engineering prompts, not a complete normative inventory.

  1. Vehicle population bounded

    Evidence to request: Vehicle-scope record. Document only when: Variants and lifecycle state are explicit.

  2. Markets and categories reviewed

    Evidence to request: Applicability decision. Document only when: Relevant markets and categories have a reviewed basis.

  3. Change decision identified

    Evidence to request: Change request. Document only when: The intended release or update decision is named.

Which vehicle configuration and decision does this review cover?
02 · Engineering and regulatory basisApplicable ISO/SAE 21434 edition, R155/R156 series, interpretations and responsibility map.
Detailed verifications (3)

Suggested review roles: Cybersecurity/update managers; homologation reviewer. Lifecycle: Engineering and approval basis. Assess each verification for this chapter’s actual scope and the role responsible for it. Record the applicable requirement/decision reference; any N/A needs a specific reason. These are CUP engineering prompts, not a complete normative inventory.

  1. Engineering basis recorded

    Evidence to request: Edition register. Document only when: The engineering standard and applicable edition are identified.

  2. R155 applicability reviewed

    Evidence to request: Homologation assessment. Document only when: CSMS and vehicle approval questions are separated.

  3. R156 applicability reviewed

    Evidence to request: Update-management assessment. Document only when: SUMS and update approval implications are separately considered.

Which engineering activities and approval obligations apply separately?
03 · Item definition and interfacesItem baseline, assets, dependencies, trust boundaries and changed interfaces.
Detailed verifications (3)

Suggested review roles: Item architect; interface owners. Lifecycle: Item definition and change impact. Assess each verification for this chapter’s actual scope and the role responsible for it. Record the applicable requirement/decision reference; any N/A needs a specific reason. These are CUP engineering prompts, not a complete normative inventory.

  1. Baseline fixed

    Evidence to request: Item definition reference. Document only when: The changed baseline can be identified.

  2. Interfaces compared

    Evidence to request: Interface delta assessment. Document only when: Changed external and internal interfaces are covered.

  3. Dependencies bounded

    Evidence to request: Dependency review. Document only when: Backend and shared-service assumptions are recorded.

What changed in the item and its attack surface?
04 · Threat analysis and risk treatmentCurrent threat scenarios, impact reasoning, attack feasibility assumptions and treatment decisions.
Detailed verifications (3)

Suggested review roles: Cybersecurity risk assessor; risk owner. Lifecycle: Threat analysis and risk treatment. Assess each verification for this chapter’s actual scope and the role responsible for it. Record the applicable requirement/decision reference; any N/A needs a specific reason. These are CUP engineering prompts, not a complete normative inventory.

  1. Threat delta assessed

    Evidence to request: Threat analysis delta. Document only when: The changed configuration is reflected in the reasoning.

  2. Treatment traced

    Evidence to request: Risk treatment record. Document only when: Each reviewed risk has an accountable treatment.

  3. Residual uncertainty accepted explicitly

    Evidence to request: Risk decision reference. Document only when: An authorised role owns the remaining uncertainty.

Does the risk analysis address the changed vehicle configuration?
05 · Goals to implementationCybersecurity goals, derived requirements, allocated owners and verification links.
Detailed verifications (3)

Suggested review roles: Requirement owners; implementation/verification leads. Lifecycle: Development and traceability. Assess each verification for this chapter’s actual scope and the role responsible for it. Record the applicable requirement/decision reference; any N/A needs a specific reason. These are CUP engineering prompts, not a complete normative inventory.

  1. Goals allocated

    Evidence to request: Goal-to-requirement trace. Document only when: Relevant goals reach named implementation owners.

  2. Implementation traced

    Evidence to request: Implementation record. Document only when: The changed requirements link to the released baseline.

  3. Verification linked

    Evidence to request: Requirement-to-result trace. Document only when: Results and deviations cover the stated claim.

Can each change-related cybersecurity claim be traced to implementation and evidence?
06 · Distributed development responsibilitiesSupplier agreements, evidence handovers, interface assumptions and escalation ownership.
Detailed verifications (3)

Suggested review roles: OEM integrator; supplier engineering lead. Lifecycle: Distributed development and handover. Assess each verification for this chapter’s actual scope and the role responsible for it. Record the applicable requirement/decision reference; any N/A needs a specific reason. These are CUP engineering prompts, not a complete normative inventory.

  1. Responsibilities agreed

    Evidence to request: Development-interface agreement. Document only when: Required handovers and decision owners are explicit.

  2. Evidence accepted critically

    Evidence to request: Supplier handover review. Document only when: Assumptions and limitations are not lost at integration.

  3. Integration gaps owned

    Evidence to request: Integration action register. Document only when: Unresolved interface questions have owners.

Who supplies the evidence and who accepts the integrated result?
07 · Verification and vehicle validationTest scope, environment, results, deviations and representative vehicle configuration.
Detailed verifications (3)

Suggested review roles: Vehicle validation owner; component verification lead. Lifecycle: Component and vehicle validation. Assess each verification for this chapter’s actual scope and the role responsible for it. Record the applicable requirement/decision reference; any N/A needs a specific reason. These are CUP engineering prompts, not a complete normative inventory.

  1. Component evidence scoped

    Evidence to request: Component result reference. Document only when: The result covers the actual version and configuration.

  2. Vehicle context validated

    Evidence to request: Vehicle validation reference. Document only when: The claimed behaviour is assessed in representative context.

  3. Deviations resolved or escalated

    Evidence to request: Deviation review. Document only when: An authorised role decides how open findings affect release.

What demonstrates that the implemented measures work in the intended context?
08 · Software identity and update targetsReleased software identifiers, applicable RXSWIN handling, target population and compatibility assessment.
Detailed verifications (3)

Suggested review roles: Configuration manager; software-update owner. Lifecycle: Software identification and target selection. Assess each verification for this chapter’s actual scope and the role responsible for it. Record the applicable requirement/decision reference; any N/A needs a specific reason. These are CUP engineering prompts, not a complete normative inventory.

  1. Software state identifiable

    Evidence to request: Software-identification record. Document only when: Released identifiers link to the intended baseline.

  2. Target variants matched

    Evidence to request: Target-population review. Document only when: Compatible vehicles are distinguished from other variants.

  3. Applicable RXSWIN handling reviewed

    Evidence to request: Regulatory software-identity assessment. Document only when: The required identification approach has an applicability rationale.

Can the intended software state be tied to the correct vehicles?
09 · Controlled update executionUpdate authorisation, authenticity and integrity checks, prerequisites, user information and delivery records.
Detailed verifications (4)

Suggested review roles: Update engineer; release authority. Lifecycle: Update readiness and installation. Assess each verification for this chapter’s actual scope and the role responsible for it. Record the applicable requirement/decision reference; any N/A needs a specific reason. These are CUP engineering prompts, not a complete normative inventory.

  1. Update authorisation checked

    Evidence to request: Release authorisation. Document only when: The package and actor have the appropriate authority.

  2. Integrity and authenticity verified

    Evidence to request: Package verification result. Document only when: Checks cover the package actually to be delivered.

  3. Installation prerequisites verified

    Evidence to request: Readiness test record. Document only when: Vehicle state and dependencies are checked before installation.

  4. Interruption handled

    Evidence to request: Approved interruption-test reference. Document only when: Power or connection loss leads to assessed handling.

What prevents an authorised update from being applied in an unsuitable state?
10 · Safe failure and recoveryFailure-state analysis, recovery strategy, constraints and validation records.
Detailed verifications (3)

Suggested review roles: Update/recovery owner; safety reviewer. Lifecycle: Failure handling and recovery validation. Assess each verification for this chapter’s actual scope and the role responsible for it. Record the applicable requirement/decision reference; any N/A needs a specific reason. These are CUP engineering prompts, not a complete normative inventory.

  1. Failure state assessed

    Evidence to request: Failure analysis. Document only when: The effect of an incomplete update is understood.

  2. Recovery strategy verified

    Evidence to request: Recovery result reference. Document only when: The strategy works under the assessed constraints.

  3. Rollback assumptions challenged

    Evidence to request: Recovery decision. Document only when: Rollback is not presumed feasible or safe in every case.

Can a failed update reach an assessed safe and recoverable state?
11 · Release and approval impactCybersecurity conclusion, unresolved issues, CSMS/SUMS links and homologation-impact review.
Detailed verifications (3)

Suggested review roles: Release authority; homologation owner. Lifecycle: Internal release and approval-impact decision. Assess each verification for this chapter’s actual scope and the role responsible for it. Record the applicable requirement/decision reference; any N/A needs a specific reason. These are CUP engineering prompts, not a complete normative inventory.

  1. Engineering conclusion owned

    Evidence to request: Cybersecurity conclusion. Document only when: The evidence and unresolved issues support an explicit internal decision.

  2. Approval impact reviewed

    Evidence to request: Homologation change-impact record. Document only when: The team has assessed changes to type-approved characteristics.

  3. Formal and internal decisions separated

    Evidence to request: Release dossier index. Document only when: Internal sign-off is not presented as an authority approval.

Who authorises release and resolves any need to update approval evidence?
12 · Post-production reassessmentMonitoring, vulnerability intake, response owners, configuration changes and review triggers.
Detailed verifications (3)

Suggested review roles: Post-production security owner; field response lead. Lifecycle: Fleet monitoring and reassessment. Assess each verification for this chapter’s actual scope and the role responsible for it. Record the applicable requirement/decision reference; any N/A needs a specific reason. These are CUP engineering prompts, not a complete normative inventory.

  1. Field evidence received

    Evidence to request: Monitoring and intake record. Document only when: Relevant findings can reach the vehicle security team.

  2. Affected variants assessed

    Evidence to request: Exposure and response review. Document only when: The deployed population can be assessed when evidence changes.

  3. Decision reopened

    Evidence to request: Reassessment trigger record. Document only when: An owner tracks invalidating changes and new findings.

What evidence or field event reopens this decision?
PRIMARY REFERENCES · REVIEWED 1 NOVEMBER 2026

Check the source and its applicability.

Public catalogue and guidance links support orientation. Licensed standards and legally authentic texts govern their respective requirements. This worksheet does not establish equivalence between standards and regulations.

ISO/SAE 21434:2021 — public scope

Use the official source to check the relevant scope, current text and applicable conditions.

Open official reference →

UN R155 — published regulatory text

Use the official source to check the relevant scope, current text and applicable conditions.

Open official reference →

UN R156 — software updates and SUMS

Use the official source to check the relevant scope, current text and applicable conditions.

Open official reference →

VCA — cybersecurity and software updating

Use the official source to check the relevant scope, current text and applicable conditions.

Open official reference →