Current guidance. On 23 September 2026 the FBI and CISA published considerations for critical-infrastructure operators working with third-party ICS integrators. The guidance highlights least privilege, monitored remote access, asset and software inventory, contractual requirements, backups and manual operating capability.

The integrator can inherit operational authority

ICS integrators may design systems, program SCADA, support devices, analyse operational data or perform daily control activities. A secure tunnel does not constrain what an authenticated third party can do once connected.

The control objective is therefore bounded authority: named identity, approved device, explicit target assets, time-limited access, least privilege and a session record that can be reconstructed after an incident.

Supplier compromise can become customer compromise

The joint guidance cites an intrusion into an industrial automation company where actors searched for customer and SCADA information and staged hundreds of files. That creates a downstream risk even without direct access to the final operator.

OT supplier governance should consequently cover where customer data is stored, how engineering files are protected, how remote access is revoked, how patches are handled and what happens operationally if the integrator becomes unavailable or untrusted. Offline backups and manual operation are resilience controls, not administrative extras.

The decision
Govern ICS integrators as privileged operational identities with bounded, observable and revocable authority, not simply as trusted users of a secure remote-access channel.
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