Evidence note. The sample includes both automotive-specific and general-purpose dependencies, so its results should not be generalised to every production vehicle stack.

Vehicle software: explain configuration-specific vulnerability status

The study combines vulnerability-database analysis with scans of selected automotive-related repositories using multiple tools. Its most operationally important result is not simply the number of findings. The tools did not produce identical results across repositories, and the authors describe cases where one scanner identified vulnerabilities that others did not.

That matters because an SBOM is an inventory artefact, not a vulnerability-management outcome. Knowing that a component exists is necessary, but the organisation still has to detect relevant vulnerability intelligence, establish whether the affected code is present and reachable, map the result to actual product versions, and decide what action is required.

Review prompts drawn from this analysis and its role brief. These identify evidence to examine, not completed verification.

Decision review checkpoints
Review lensDecision or boundaryEvidence and constraints
Engineering architectureCompare scanner coverage and document known blind spots instead of relying on one tool as ground truth.Track reused dependencies across products so one vulnerable library can be assessed consistently at fleet or portfolio scale.
Cybersecurity boundaryUse VEX or equivalent records to preserve the technical justification for affected and not-affected decisions.Retain remediation and post-fix verification evidence with the vulnerability record.
Operational decisionJudge maturity by the evidence chain from inventory to applicability, remediation and verification.Scanner disagreement and shared dependencies create governance and blast-radius questions that require explicit reconciliation.

Vulnerability management: govern evidence across the lifecycle

The paper identifies 413 automotive vulnerabilities across its study period and 827 vulnerable libraries in the repository scans. It also highlights overlap in commonly reused dependencies. That creates a blast-radius problem: one vulnerable dependency can require assessment across multiple products, branches and suppliers.

A mature process therefore needs a repeatable chain: component inventory, vulnerability detection, applicability assessment, VEX or equivalent decision record, risk treatment, remediation, verification and retained evidence. Scanner disagreement becomes a governance input rather than an excuse to select the most convenient result.

For OEMs and suppliers, the key assurance question is not whether an SBOM exists. It is whether a new vulnerability can be traced through that chain quickly enough to produce a defensible product decision.

An SBOM improves visibility. Vulnerability-management assurance comes from the evidence chain that turns visibility into a product-specific decision.
The decision
Test the complete vulnerability decision path across tools, products, versions and suppliers instead of treating SBOM generation as the control objective.
Operational checks
  • Compare scanner coverage and document known blind spots.
  • Bind findings to product and software-version scope.
  • Require technical justification for affected and not-affected decisions.
  • Track shared dependencies across products to understand blast radius.
  • Retain remediation and verification evidence with the vulnerability decision.
Source record

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